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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Levie Raymond Bullock appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdict finding him guilty of robbery.  On appeal, Bullock challenges the 
sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction.  Alternatively, he argues for the 
first time on appeal that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury regarding 
the mental state necessary for robbery under an aiding/abetting theory. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 In the early morning hours of June 24, 2015, Bullock accompanied 
Brandee Moseby, Devin Elmore, Amber Lopez, and at least one other individual 
to the home of Zachary Wall.  (Tr., p.180, L.3 – p.183, L.2; p.217, L.23 – p.218, 
L.14; State’s Exhibit 1.)  Zachary, Jennifer Logan (Zachary’s then fiancée), 
Michael Osborn, Maritschka Bleau, and Jennifer’s five-year-old son were all at 
Zachary’s apartment when Bullock and his companions arrived.  (Tr., p.180, L.3 
– p.183, L.15.)  At the time, Zachary was “in and out of a seizure” as a result of 
having used methamphetamine.  (Tr., p.172, Ls.8-16, p.182, Ls.7-19.)  Jennifer 
had also used methamphetamine and was “attending to Zachary” when she 
heard a knock on the door.  (Tr., p.181, L.5 – p.182, L.21, p.190, Ls.4-20.)  
Jennifer looked out the window to see who it was and recognized Brandee and 
Devin.  (Tr., p.182, L.7 – p.183, L.4.)  Against Jennifer’s and Maritschka’s 
instructions, Michael opened the door and let Bullock and his companions inside.  
(Tr., p.182, L.25 – p.183, L.15.) 
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 After entering the apartment, Brandee, Amber, and Devin said that “their 
house had just been robbed,” and they “asked permission to search” the 
apartment for their belongings.  (Tr., p.183, L.23 – p.184, L.19.)  Jennifer “gave 
them permission to do that,” at which point Brandee, Amber, Devin, and Bullock 
all “start[ed] going through [Zachary’s and Jennifer’s] things.”  (Tr., p.184, L.18 – 
p.185, L.2.)  At some point during the encounter, Bullock got a clothes hamper 
and “loaded” it with several of Zachary’s and Jennifer’s belongings, including an 
X-Box 360, a DVD player, and multiple phones.  (Tr., p.186, L.5 – p.187, L.18.)  
Jennifer told Bullock and the others not to take her things, but she did not do 
more to stop them because “[t]he first time that [she] got up to say something,” 
Devin “grabbed” her, “slammed [her] against the wall,” and “told [her] to sit down 
and shut up.”  (Tr., p.187, L.19 – p.188, L.2.)  Devin had a handgun tucked in the 
waistband of his pants, and he and Brandee and Amber threatened to harm 
Jennifer and Zachary if they went “to the P.O.’s or the cops.”  (Tr., p.185, L.3 – 
p.186, L.3.)  Bullock and his companions eventually left the apartment “as a 
group” and “load[ed] up everything into the vehicle.”  (Tr., p.186, Ls.10-14.) 
 In an interview with the police several weeks later, Bullock admitted he 
was with Brandee and Devin when they went to Zachary’s house and took 
Zachary’s and Jennifer’s belongings, but he denied having willingly participated 
in the robberies.  (State’s Exhibit 1.)  According to Bullock, before they went to 
Zachary’s apartment, Brandee and Devin and two other individuals showed up at 
Bullock’s house and accused Amber and him of stealing from them.  (Id. at 1:00-
1:50, 4:00-4:15, 9:45-9:55.)  Bullock said Devin was a member of the “SVC” 
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gang and that he was “aggressive” with Bullock and Amber; he looked through 
Bullock’s “stuff,” showed Bullock and Amber his gun, and sprayed “bug spray” in 
Amber’s face.  (Id. at 1:53-2:00, 3:13-3:20, 9:55-10:15, 11:05-11:35.)  Bullock 
said Brandee and Devin “forced” Amber and him to go to Zachary’s house.  (Id. 
at 4:00-5:13, 9:55-10:15.)  Bullock claimed Brandee was the one who loaded 
Zachary’s and Jennifer’s belongings into a laundry hamper and that “the only 
thing that [he] did” was lift a board to access the crawl space.  (Id. at 2:01-2:42, 
5:15-5:50.)  According to Bullock, he and Amber left Zachary’s house while 
Brandee and Devin were still there.  (Id. at 6:05-6:20.) 
 The state charged Bullock with four counts of robbery but dismissed two 
of the counts before trial.  (R., pp.52-54, 72, 97.)  As to the remaining charges, 
the state proceeded on a theory that Bullock aided and abetted the robberies of 
Zachary Wall (Count I) and Jennifer Logan (Count III).  (R., pp.141-144; Tr., 
p.142, L.14 – p.145, L.19, p.237, L.14 – p.245, L.8, p.250, L.2 – p.252, L.6.)  
Consistent with the statements he had made to police, Bullock testified at trial 
that he was an unwilling participant in the robberies.  (Tr., p.213, L.12 – p.224, 
L.25.)  During deliberations, the jury sent the trial court the following question:  
“What is the dictionary’s definition of ‘abetted’[?]”  (R., p.157.)  With the parties’ 
consent, and consistent with the aiding and abetting instructions it had already 
given, the trial court responded: “To abet another to commit a crime is to 
command, procure, counsel, encourage, induce, or assist.”  (R., p.157; see also 
R., pp.141-42, 44 (elements and aiding and abetting instructions).)  Ultimately, 
the jury was unable to reach a verdict as to the robbery of Zachary alleged in 
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Count I, but it found Bullock guilty of the robbery of Jennifer alleged in Count III.  
(R., pp.158-59.)  The state thereafter dismissed Count I, and the trial court 
entered a Judgment of Conviction on Count III and sentenced Bullock to a 
unified term of 10 years, with one year fixed.  (R., pp.160-61, 163-64, 168-71.)  
Bullock timely appealed.  (R., pp.177-79, 185-89.) 
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ISSUES 
 
Bullock states the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support Mr. Bullock’s robbery 
 conviction? 
 
2. Was the jury properly instructed on the mental state 
 necessary for robbery under an aiding/abetting theory? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.8.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Did the state present substantial, competent evidence to prove beyond a 
 reasonable doubt that Bullock was guilty of robbery? 
 
2. Has Bullock failed to show the trial court committed fundamental error in 
 its jury instructions? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
The State Presented Substantial, Competent Evidence To Support Bullock’s 
Robbery Conviction 
 
A. Introduction 
 Bullock challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
conviction for aiding and abetting robbery.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-12.)  
Specifically, Bullock argues that, “[o]n the evidence presented at trial, no rational 
trier of fact could have found that Mr. Bullock shared the criminal intent of [the 
principals] and that there was a community of purpose in the robbery of Jennifer 
Logan.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.9.)  Bullock’s argument fails.  A review of the trial 
record shows the state presented substantial, competent evidence to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Bullock had the requisite intent to aid and abet  
robbery. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “Appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence is limited in scope.”  State 
v. Marsh, 153 Idaho 360, 365, 283 P.3d 107, 112 (Ct. App. 2011).  An appellate 
court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict if 
there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Miller, 
131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 
121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992).  In conducting this review the 
appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of 
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences 
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to be drawn from the evidence.  Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State 
v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991).  Moreover, the facts, 
and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding 
the jury’s verdict.  Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State v. Hart, 
112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). 
 
C. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable 
Doubt That Bullock Intended To Aid And Abet Robbery 
 
 “An individual who participates in or assists the commission of an offense 
is guilty of aiding and abetting the crime.”  State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 
199, 204, 75 P.3d 1209, 1214 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v. Gonzalez, 
134 Idaho 907, 909, 12 P.3d 382, 384 (Ct. App. 2000)); see also I.C. § 18-204 
(“All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, … whether they directly 
commit the act constituting the offense or aid and abet in its commission, … are 
principals in any crime so committed.”).  Mere knowledge of a crime or assent or 
acquiescence in its commission does not create accomplice liability through 
aiding and abetting.  State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 383, 195 P.3d 737, 742 
(Ct. App. 2008).  Rather, “[a]iding and abetting requires some proof that the 
accused either participated in or assisted, encouraged, solicited, or counseled 
the crime.”  State v. Rivas, 129 Idaho 20, 24, 921 P.2d 197, 201 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(citing State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344, 347, 787 P.2d 1152, 1155 (1990)).  “The 
mental state required is generally the same as that required for the underlying 
offense—the aider and abettor must share the criminal intent of the principal and 
there must be a community of purpose in the unlawful undertaking.”  Romero-
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Garcia, 139 Idaho at 204, 75 P.3d at 1214 (citing State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 
380, 386, 716 P.2d 1152, 1158 (1985)).   
 In this case, the jury found Bullock guilty of aiding and abetting the 
robbery of Jennifer Logan.  (R., pp.142, 159.)  Robbery is a specific intent crime; 
it “requires the intent to both take the victim’s property by use of force or fear and 
to permanently deprive the victim of the property.”  State v. Martinez, 133 Idaho 
484, 487, 988 P.2d 710, 713 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Belue, 127 Idaho 
464, 466, 902 P.2d 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1995)); see also I.C. § 18-6501 (defining 
robbery as “the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of 
another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, 
accomplished by means of force or fear); State v. Olin, 111 Idaho 516, 518-19, 
725 P.2d 801, 803-04 (Ct. App. 1986).  Thus, to sustain Bullock’s conviction for  
aiding and abetting robbery, the state was required to prove that Bullock 
“participated in or assisted, encouraged, solicited, or counseled” the robbery of 
Jennifer Logan, Rivas, 129 Idaho at 24, 921 P.2d at 201, and that he did so with 
the intent both to take Jennifer’s property by use of force or fear and to 
permanently deprive her of her property, Martinez, 133 Idaho at 487, 988 P.2d at 
713.  Contrary to Bullock’s assertions on appeal, a review of the trial record 
shows the state met its burden. 
 Jennifer testified that Bullock was one of several individuals who 
“show[ed] up,” “uninvited,” at her home in the middle of the night.  (Tr., p.182, L.7 
– p.183, L.22.)  After Jennifer gave the group “permission to search [the] 
residence to see if their belongings were there,” Bullock and the others “start[ed] 
  9 
going through [Jennifer’s and Zachary Wall’s] things,” and Bullock loaded a 
number of Jennifer’s and Zachary’s belongings into a laundry hamper.  (Tr., 
p.183, L.18 – p.187, L.18.)  Although Bullock was not armed, one of his 
companions, Devin Elmore, had a handgun visibly tucked in the waistband of his 
pants.  (Tr., p.185, Ls.3-19.)  When Jennifer told Bullock and the others not to 
take her things, Devin “slammed [her] against the wall” and “told [her] to sit down 
and shut up.”  (Tr., p.187, L.22 – p.188, L.2.)  Devin and Brandee and Amber 
also threatened to harm Jennifer and Zachary if they reported the incident to 
police.  (Tr., p.185, L.20 – p.186, L.4.)  While participating in the robbery, Bullock 
did what his companions told him to do, but he did not look scared.  (Tr., p.186, 
L.5 – p.187, L.6, p.194, L.22 – p.195, L.4.)  Ultimately, he and his companions 
left Jennifer’s and Zachary’s apartment “as a group” and “load[ed] up everything” 
they had taken from the apartment into a vehicle.  (Tr., p.188, Ls.10-14.) 
 Construing the facts and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
facts in favor of upholding the jury’s verdict, the foregoing evidence was sufficient 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bullock had the intent necessary to 
sustain his conviction for robbery.  As Bullock acknowledges on appeal (see 
Appellant’s brief, p.11), “direct evidence of intent is not required.  It may be 
shown by circumstantial evidence, or proven by the defendant’s acts and 
conduct.”  Mitchell, 146 Idaho at 384, 195 P.3d at 743; see also State v. Oldham, 
92 Idaho 124, 132, 438 P.2d 275, 283 (1968) (“Specific intent may, and 
ordinarily must, be proved by circumstantial evidence.” (citations omitted)); State 
v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 573, 181 P.3d 496, 499 (Ct. App. 2007) (“Criminal 
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intent can be inferred from the commission of acts and the surrounding 
circumstances.” (citations omitted)); Belue, 127 Idaho at 467, 902 P.2d at 492 
(same).  Evidence that Bullock accompanied several individuals, one of whom 
was armed, into Jennifer’s house in the middle of the night, searched through 
her things, loaded her property into a laundry hamper, and left the house with her 
property and with the people who had threatened to harm her if she reported the 
incident to the police was evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer 
that Bullock actively participated in the robbery with the specific intent to take 
Jennifer’s property by use of force or fear and to permanently deprive her of the 
property taken. 
 In arguing that the state failed to meet its burden of proving the mental 
state element necessary to convict him of aiding and abetting robbery, Bullock 
argues the “role” he “played in the robbery” was “extremely limited” and “simply 
cannot support an inference that he shared in [the principals’] criminal intent to 
take personal property from Jennifer, and that there was a community of purpose 
in such undertaking.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.11.)  To support this argument, 
counsel for Bullock makes the following representation:  “She [Jennifer] testified 
that Mr. Bullock ‘was just listening to what was being told to him’ and did not act 
on his own volition.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.11 (citing Tr., p.187, Ls.1-4).)   This 
representation is only partially accurate.  When asked by the prosecutor whether 
Bullock was “interacting with Brandee Moseby and Devin Elmore during” the time 
that Bullock was loading Jennifer’s and Zachary’s personal belongings into the 
hamper, Jennifer did testify, “He was just listening to what was being told to him.”  
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(Tr., p.186, L.5 – p.187, L.4.)  Contrary to Bullock’s assertion, however, Jennifer 
never testified that Bullock “did not act on his own volition.”  Nor does the 
evidence, viewed in favor of upholding the jury’s verdict, mandate such a 
conclusion.   
 Evidence that, during the robbery, Bullock “was just listening to what was 
being told to him,” and even that he followed one or more of the principal’s 
instructions regarding what items of property to take and retain (see Tr., p.194, 
L.22 – p.195, L.4), is not inconsistent with the jury’s finding that Bullock 
participated in the robbery with the requisite intent to take Jennifer’s property by 
the use of force or fear and to permanently deprive her of the property.  Nor was 
the jury required to believe Bullock’s self-serving testimony that he was an 
unwilling participant in the robbery.  See, e.g., State v. Jones, 145 Idaho 639, 
641, 181 P.3d 1247, 1249 (Ct. App. 2008) (“Credibility determinations are within 
the province of the jury.”).  Bullock may not have been the ring-leader of the 
operation, but evidence that he assisted the principals in taking Jennifer’s 
property by the use of force and fear and that he, along with the principals, 
removed the property from Jennifer’s apartment was sufficient evidence from 
which the jury could conclude that Bullock had the requisite intent to aid and abet 
the robbery.  Bullock’s arguments to the contrary are without merit.  
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II. 
Bullock Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Jury Instructions 
 
A. Introduction 
 For the first time on appeal, Bullock argues the trial court failed to 
“properly instruct the jury on the mental state necessary for robbery under an 
aiding/abetting theory.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-16.)  A review of the record and 
of the applicable law shows that Bullock has failed to demonstrate error, much 
less fundamental error, in the challenged instructions. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which this 
Court exercises free review.  State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 
414, 430 (2009).  “An error in jury instructions only constitutes reversible error 
when the instruction misled the jury or prejudiced the party challenging the 
instruction.”  Id. (citation omitted).  “If the instructions, considered as a whole, 
fairly and adequately present the issues and state the applicable law, then no 
error has been committed.”  Id. (quotations, citation and brackets omitted).   
 When a defendant fails to object to a jury instruction, an appellate court 
will only review the instruction for fundamental error.  State v. Adamcik, 
152 Idaho 445, 472, 272 P.3d 417, 444 (2012) (citing State v. Johnson, 
145 Idaho 970, 977, 188 P.3d 912, 919 (2008); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010)).  To prove fundamental error, the defendant 
must demonstrate: “(1) the alleged error violated an unwaived constitutional 
right; (2) the alleged error plainly exists; and (3) the alleged error was not 
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harmless.”  Id. at 473, 272 P.3d at 445 (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d 
at 980).   
 
C. Bullock Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error, In The 
 Jury Instructions 
 
 In order for Bullock to be guilty of aiding and abetting the robbery of 
Jennifer Logan, the state was required to prove that Bullock assisted in the 
commission of the offense with the intent to take Jennifer’s property by use of 
force or fear and to permanently deprive her of her property.  I.C. §§ 18-204, 18-
6501; State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 204, 75 P.3d 1209, 1214 
(Ct. App. 2003); State v. Martinez, 133 Idaho 484, 487, 988 P.2d 710, 713 
(Ct. App. 1999).  Consistent with the applicable statutes, and with the pattern jury 
instructions on aiding and abetting (see ICJI 311 and 312), the district court 
instructed the jury on the elements of aiding and abetting robbery, as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
 
 In order for the defendant to be guilty of Count Three: 
Robbery, the State must prove each of the following: 
 
 1. On or about June 24, 2015 
 2. in the State of Idaho 
 3. Jennifer Wall, also known as Jennifer Logan, had 
possession of personal property, 
 4. which the defendant Levie Raymond Bullock aided, 
abetted, assisted or helped in taking the property from her person 
or from her immediate presence, 
 5. against her will, 
 6. by the intentional use of force or fear to overcome her 
will, and 
 7. with the intent permanently to [sic] deprive her of the 
property. 
 
 If any of the above has not been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty.  If each 
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of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
you must find the defendant guilty. 
 
(R., p.142.)  The court also gave the following definitional instruction: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
 
 The law makes no distinction between a person who directly 
participates in the acts constituting a crime and a person who, 
either before or during its commission, intentionally aids, assists, 
facilitates, promotes, encourages, counsels, solicits, invites, helps 
or hires another to commit a crime with intent to promote or assist 
in its commission.  Both can be found guilty of the crime.  Mere 
presence at, acquiescence in, or silent consent to, the planning or 
commission of a crime is not [in the absence of a duty to act] 
sufficient to make one an accomplice. 
 
(R., p.144.)  The former instruction used language consistent with the pattern 
instruction on aiding and abetting and complied with its directive that the 
definition of aiding and abetting “should be incorporated into the instruction 
stating the elements of the crime.”  (Compare R., p.142 with ICJI 312.)  The 
latter instruction was a verbatim recitation of the pattern instruction defining 
“aiders and abetters/principals” (compare R., p.144 with ICJI 311) and, as such, 
was a presumptively correct statement of the law.  State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 
85, 253 P.3d 754, 759 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Ruel, 141 Idaho 600, 
602, 114 P.3d 158, 160 (Ct. App. 2005)) (“The pattern ICJI instructions are 
presumptively correct.”). 
 On appeal, Bullock concedes he did not object to the elements 
instructions below.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-14.)  Nevertheless, he contends he 
is entitled to relief under the fundamental error doctrine because, he asserts, “the 
jury was [not] properly instructed on the mental state necessary for liability under 
an aiding/abetting theory.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.13.)  Specifically, he contends 
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the instructions were erroneous because they did not include the precise 
language set forth in one of the comments to ICJI 312 (but not in the language of 
the pattern instruction itself) that “the mental state required for aiding and 
abetting ‘is generally the same as that required for the underlying offense—the 
aider and abettor must share the criminal intent of the principal and there must 
[be] a community of purpose in the unlawful undertaking.’”  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.13, 15 (quoting Comment to ICJI 312 which, in turn, cites State v. Scroggins, 
110 Idaho 380, 716 P.2d 1152 (1985)).)  The state acknowledges the quoted 
language is a correct statement of the law.  Contrary to Bullock’s assertions, 
however, the trial court was not required to include a verbatim recitation of the 
quoted language in its instructions because the instructions, as given, accurately 
stated the law on the mental state element of aiding and abetting robbery.  
Bullock has failed to show any error, much less fundamental error, that would 
entitle him to relief. 
 “A trial court presiding over a criminal case must instruct the jury on all 
matters of law necessary for the jury’s information.”  State v. Severson, 
147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 414, 430 (2009) (citing I.C. § 19-2132).  “This 
necessarily includes instructions on the ‘nature and elements of the crime 
charged and the essential legal principles applicable to the evidence that has 
been admitted.’”  Id. (citing State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 172, 90 P.3d 920, 922 
(Ct. App. 2004)).  As noted above, the trial court in this case specifically 
instructed the jury that, in order to be guilty of aiding and abetting the robbery of 
Jennifer Logan, Bullock must have “aided, abetted, assisted or helped in taking” 
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Jennifer’s property, “against her will,”  “by the intentional use of force or fear to 
overcome her will, and … with the intent permanently to [sic] deprive her of the 
property.”  (R., p.142 (emphasis added).)  This instruction accurately stated the 
mental state element of aiding and abetting robbery and, on its face, conveyed 
that Bullock could only be found guilty if the state proved that he, personally, 
acted with the intent both to use force or fear to take Jennifer’s property and to 
permanently deprive her of the property taken.  Even if the elements instruction 
did not alone make clear that Bullock must have “shared the criminal intent” of 
the principals and “acted with a community of purpose in the unlawful 
undertaking,” the definition of aider and abettors/principals set forth in Instruction 
No. 18 did.  (See R., p.144 (instructing that accomplice is someone who 
“intentionally aids, assists, facilitates, promotes, encourages, counsels, solicits, 
invites, helps or hires another to commit a crime with the intent to promote or 
assist in its commission” and that “[m]ere presence at, acquiescence in, or silent 
consent to, the planning or commission of a crime is not … sufficient” (emphasis 
added)).)  Because the instructions as a whole accurately set forth the mental 
state element of aiding and abetting robbery, Bullock has failed to show that the 
trial court erred by not further instructing the jury using the specific language 
from Scroggins and the comment to ICJI 312. 
 As support for his claim that the district court plainly erred by not giving 
the jury a “specific instruction” based on Scroggins and the comment to ICJI 312, 
Bullock relies on State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 253 P.3d 754 (Ct. App. 2011).  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.15-16.)  Reid was convicted of two counts of aiding and 
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abetting first degree murder.  Reid, 151 Idaho at 82-83, 253 P.3d at 756-57.  
Like Bullock, Reid argued on appeal that the trial court committed fundamental 
error because its elements instructions omitted the requirement that Reid share 
the mental state of the principal, Kienholz.  Id. at 83, 253 P.3d at 757.  The Idaho 
Court of Appeals rejected Reid’s argument, noting the “jury instructions were 
appropriate under Scroggins” and, “[w]hether required or not, the jury was, in 
fact, told in Instruction 24 that the State must prove that Reid shared Kienholz’s 
mental state by requiring Reid to have ‘shar[ed] the criminal intent’ of Kienholz 
such that Reid and Kienholz had a ‘community of purpose in the unlawful 
undertaking.’”  Id. at 86, 253 P.3d at 760 (emphasis added).  
 Bullock’s reliance on Reid for the proposition that the district court was 
required to instruct the jury using the specific “shared criminal intent” and 
“community of purpose” language articulated in the comment to ICJI 312 and 
Scroggins is clearly misguided.  Although the Reid Court held that such an 
instruction is a correct statement of the law, it did not hold that such an 
instruction is mandated in every aiding and abetting case.  Rather, the Court 
discussed the instruction in the context of addressing Reid’s claim that the jury 
instructions omitted the requirement that Reid share the mental state of the 
principal, and the Court rejected that claim because, “[w]hether required or not, 
the jury was, in fact,” so instructed.  Reid, 151 Idaho at 86, 253 P.3d at 760.  
Notably, the Reid Court found that other instructions given in the case not only 
“embodie[d] the articulation of criminal intent under the applicable law,” but also 
admonished that Reid could only be found guilty “if he ‘intentionally aids, assists, 
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facilitates, promotes, encourages, counsels, solicits, invites, helps or hires 
another to commit a crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission.’”  Id. 
Considering the instructions in their totality, the Reid Court found the 
“instructions were not erroneous, let alone plainly so.”  Id. 
 Like the instructions at issue in Reid, the instructions in this case, 
considered in their totality, “embodie[d] the articulation of criminal intent under 
the applicable law” and permitted the jury to find Bullock guilty of aiding and 
abetting robbery only if he intentionally assisted in the commission of the crime 
with the intent to promote or assist in its commission.  Because the instructions 
effectively, if not explicitly, required the jury to find Bullock shared the criminal 
intent of the principals and acted with a community of purpose, Bullock has failed 
to show the instructions were erroneous, “let alone plainly so.”  Reid, 151 Idaho 
at 86, 253 P.3d at 760.  His claim of fundamental error in the instructions 
therefore fails. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury’s verdict finding Bullock guilty of robbery. 
 DATED this  day of 27th July, 2017. 
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 Deputy Attorney General 
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